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ATTORNEY LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES: A LOOK
TO THE FUTURE
Donald B. Hilliker*
INTRODUCTION
In 1983, the American Bar Association declared that lawyers have an
ethical obligation to represent their clients competently.' Surprisingly, this
was the first time the profession affirmatively expressed that, as profession-
als, lawyers must apply reasonably necessary legal knowledge, skill, thor-
oughness and preparation to their work. 2 Also in 1983, the organized bar
recognized that the lawyer was no longer the single-minded advocate coun-
seling an individual client.3
Under the 1969 American Bar Association's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, the lawyer's role was essentially that of an advocate and coun-
selor who represented individual clients and eschewed unseemly
"commercialism." ' 4 Less than ten years later, the American Bar Association,
dissatisfied with the Code as a statement of a lawyer's professional obliga-
tions, established a commission to evaluate professional standards.
The product of that Commission's work was the 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. The Model Rules express the complex role of the
lawyer in the 1980s as follows:
A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As
advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the
client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications.
As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules
of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advanta-
geous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with
others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their
* Partner, Phelan, Pope & John, Chicago, Illinois; B.S., 1966, Loyola University; J.D.,
1969, Northwestern University (Cum Laude). Mr. Hilliker has practiced and lectured in the
areas of lawyer liability and responsibility for many years and serves on the Illinois Supreme
Court's Committee on Professional Responsibility.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 comment (1983). Until 1970, some
viewed competence as not being one of the lawyer's professional duties. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6101(A)(3) (1980) (Model Code prohibited neglect of a legal
matter but was silent as to competence).
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
4. See Address to the Banking, Corporate, Business Law Section, New York Bar
Association, January 24, 1974.
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divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson
for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.,
From the counselor and advocate of the past, the lawyer is now also regarded
as a negotiator, intermediary and evaluator. These latter roles are far more
complex as the lawyer's loyalties and focus are no longer solely on his or
her specific client.
The recognition of these varying roles of the lawyer reflects the startling
changes that have occurred within the legal profession over the past twenty
to twenty-five years. Beginning in the 1960s, congressional legislation in-
jected lawyers and the courts into the workplace, marketplace, schools and
the environment in ways unknown to any previous generation. At the same
time, the nation's economy shifted from a manufacturing-based one to an
information- and service-oriented consumer society. Over this period, the
number of attorneys increased dramatically to almost 700,000, or about one
lawyer for every 340 Americans. 6 By the turn of the century, there could be
well over 1,000,000 lawyers in this country.
As a service provider, the legal profession's dramatic expansion should
not have been unexpected. Lawyers have become central players in the
financial markets because legal services are essential to the successful sale
of securities and the takeover of companies. The most profitable law firm
in the country, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz of New York City, reportedly
generated annual profits of almost $1,500,000 per partner in 1986 on the
strength of its reputation as a takeover firm.7 Litigation has become the
prevalent, though often maligned, means of transferring assets to persons
injured in our current technological society.
As an industry, lawyers in private practice probably generated well over
$60 billion in gross income in 1986.8 This figure compares with $19 billion
in 19779 and $10.9 billion in 1972.10 Law is big business even when compared
to major manufacturing and service industries. During 1982, for example,
the $34 billion of lawyer revenues surpassed both the $4.2 billion earned by
the motion picture industry and the $11 billion harvested by the tobacco
industry. Even the computer-equipment field generated less revenues than
private attorneys.
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
6. Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors of the
American Bar Association, American Bar Association Commission of Professionalism (1986)
at 6.
7. The Am Law 100, AM. LAW., Jul.-Aug. 1987, at 32.
8. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1987, Part 2 (Magazine), at 55.
9. Id.
10. Flaherty, The $38 Billion Dollar Legal Market, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 30, 1984, at 2.
11. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 1984, at 27-7, 52-53, 39-1; See
also Flaherty, supra note 10, at 2. The statistics vastly underestimate the impact of lawyers on
the economy by omitting government attorneys and corporate counsel, who comprise almost
one-third of the entire bar.
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Increasingly, aggressive competition for legal work has become the norm.
With lawyer advertising given constitutional protection in 1976,12 lawyers
and law firms have openly competed with each other for lucrative work.
That competition has grown and expanded to the point that law firms
frequently seek quality lawyers through lateral hirings or mergers with other
firms to improve their "product mix" for the potential client. Because the
client is approached continually by other lawyers eager to replace existing
counsel, the lawyer and law firm are increasingly colored as a service provider
without great client loyalty and to whom the client has no close ties.
This emphasis on competition and the "sale" of a "quality product" by
the firm or lawyer will likely cause more persons adversely affected by lawyer
conduct to seek redress. This Article will address one aspect of lawyer
liability-liability to third parties-which may well expand in the near future.
The Article will first place third party liability in historical context and then
discuss third party liability as it has developed for manufacturers and ac-
countants. At that point, trends in the law of lawyer liability to third persons
will be examined. 3
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Third party liability has its historical roots in the privity of contract
theory. In the 1842 landmark case of Winterbottom v. Wright,'4 a British
court refused to find the manufacturer of a mailcoach liable to a coachman
injured when the coach suddenly collapsed. The court came to this conclusion
because the parties lacked privity of contract. The court stated: "Unless we
confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered
into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can
see no limit, would ensue."'" Subsequently, American courts construed this
statement to mean that a third party not in privity with a defendant-man-
ufacturer could not pursue a contract or tort action against a manufacturer
for physical injuries arising from the manufacturer's negligent conduct. 6
In National Savings Bank v. Ward,'7 decided in 1880, the United States
Supreme Court followed the Winterbottom analysis and held that in the
12. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977).
13. This paper will not address attorney liability premised on statutory liabilities, partic-
ularly the federal and state securities laws and the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Those statutes have been used effectively in
imposing liability by third parties against lawyers.
14. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
15. Id. at 405. In Winterbottom, the injured driver sued the defendant-manufacturer
who had contracted with the postal office to keep the mailcoach in adequate repair. Id. at 402-
03.
16. See, e.g., Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N.E.2d 482 (1907);
Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 A. 244 (1891); Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870). See
Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME
LAW, 588, 589-90 (1972) [hereinafter Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys].
17. 100 U.S. 195 (1880).
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absence of fraud, collusion or privity of contract, an attorney could not be
held liable to a non-client in an action arising from the negligent performance
of his professional duties. Ward involved a suit by a creditor against an
attorney in which the creditor alleged that he was induced to make a loan
to the attorney's client on the basis of a negligently issued title certificate.
The bank accepted a trust deed to property purportedly owned by the client
as security on a $500 loan, and when the client defaulted on the loan, the
bank discovered that the secured property had been conveyed through a deed
that the attorney negligently had overlooked. 8 The Supreme Court held that
although the attorney should have discovered the sale, a third party could
not recover on the basis of negligence because the obligation of the attorney
was to his client and not to a third party. 19 The Court's decision was based
on the line of English cases expressing concern that liability beyond the
confines of contractual privity could lead to an impracticable extreme.20
By 1916, the doctrine of strict privity as a prerequisite for liability began
to be undermined in a negligence action involving bodily injury. In Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 21 a plaintiff was injured when the wheel of
his car fell apart. The plaintiff had purchased the car from a retail dealer,
who in turn had purchased it from the defendant-manufacturer." The
plaintiff submitted evidence that a defect in the wheel could have been
discovered by a reasonable inspection and that no such inspection had
occurred. 3 MacPherson was decided on the issue of whether the defendant-
manufacturer owed a duty of care and vigilance to anyone other than its
immediate purchaser. 24 Justice Benjamin Cardozo concluded that when the
nature of a product is such that it is reasonably certain to be dangerous
when negligently made and that use of the product by third parties is
reasonably foreseeable, the manufacturer is under a duty to third parties. 25
18. Id. at 196-98.
19. Id. at 200. The court stated that "unless there is something in the circumstance of
this case to take it out of that general rule, it seems clear that the proposition of the defendant
must be sustained." Id.
20. Id. at 202-03 (quoting Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 402). Although the outcome
in Ward was consistent with the authority of the day, a dissenting opinion noted that the cir-
cumstances of the case should have satisfied the attorney that his certificate was to be used as
evidence of the facts he certified in a transaction with a third party. Id. at 207 (Waite, C.J.,
dissenting). Given that the certificate foreseeably would be used by third parties, three justices
would have held the attorney liable to the bank for losses sustained in reliance on the cer-
tificate. Id. at 208.
21. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
22. Id. at 384, 111 N.E. at 1051.
23. Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1051.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. Justice Cardozo stated:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing
else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put
its source in the law.
Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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In 1922, the New York Court of Appeals, again in an opinion by Justice
Cardozo, held that public weighers hired by a seller to certify the weight of
beans could be liable to a buyer who had relied on the certificate despite
the absence of contractual privity. 26 In Glanzer v. Shepard,21 a certificate of
weight was paid for by the seller, with copies furnished to the plaintiff-
buyer. In extending a duty on the part of the weighers to the buyer, Justice
Cardozo emphasized that the use of the certificate was not an indirect or
collateral consequence of the defendants' actions, but rather was a "conse-
quence which, to the [defendants'] knowledge, was the end and aim of the
transaction. ' 2 The Glanzer outcome rested on the fact that the defendants
were aware that the buyer would only complete the transaction in reliance
on the certificate. 29
Justice Cardozo distinguished Ward on the basis that the attorney there
had no knowledge of how the certificate of title was to be used or to whom
it was to be presented.3 0 Justice Cardozo was careful to distinguish between
a casual response and the performance of an act intended to sway
conduct." Finally, it is important to recognize that Justice Cardozo ex-
pressly declined to ground the outcome in Glanzer in terms of a contractual
third party beneficiary theory, but rather defined the obligation in terms of
a duty.12
In 1931, the New York Court of Appeals faced a claim by a third party
seeking to impose liability on accountants for the performance of professional
26. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275.
29. Id. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276.
30. Id. at 240, 135 N.E. at 276
31. Id. at 241, 135 N.E. at 276-77. The court stated:
Here the defendants are held, not merely for careless words . . .but for the
careless performance of a service-the act of weighing-which happens to have
found in the words of a certificate its culmination and its summary .... The line
of separation between these diverse liabilities is difficult to draw. It does not lose
for that reason its correspondence with realities. Life has relations not capable
always of division into inflexible compartments. The molds expand and shrink.
Id. (citations omitted).
32. Id. Justice Cardozo stated:
We state the defendants' obligation, therefore, in terms, not of contract merely,
but of duty. Other forms of statement are possible. They involve, at most, a change
of emphasis .... If we fix our gaze upon the aspect, we shall stress the element
of contract, and treat the defendants' promise as embracing the rendition of a
service which, though ordered and paid for by one, was either wholly or in part
the benefit of another .... These other methods of approach arrive at the same
goal, though the paths may seem at times to be artificial or circuitous. We have
preferred to reach the goal more simply. The defendants, acting not casually, nor
as mere servants, but in the pursuit of an independent calling, weighed and certified
at the order of one with the very end and aim of shaping the conduct of another.
Diligence was owing, not only to him who ordered, but to him also who relied.
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services. In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche," the court was confronted with a
case where the "end and aim" of the contractual relationship was, at least
arguably, designed to influence an unknown class of third parties. The
defendant-accountants were employed by a corporation to prepare and certify
a balance sheet exhibiting the condition of the corporation's business.3 4 The
defendants were aware that the corporation required extensive credit and
that the certified balance sheet would be exhibited to "banks, creditors,
stockholders, purchasers or sellers ...as the basis of financial dealings." 35
Defendants, however, had no knowledge as to whom the balance sheets
would be shown, or the extent or number of the transactions in which they
would be used.3 6 The plaintiff in Ultramares was a creditor of the corporation
that had extended credit on the basis of the certified balance sheets that
were ultimately found to be inaccurate.3 7
Contemplating the prospect of "indeterminate liability to an indeterminate
class," Justice Cardozo balked at extending Glanzer:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a
flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences."
Justice Cardozo distinguished Glanzer on the ground that reliance by the
third party in Glanzer was foreseen at the time of the transaction:
Here was something more than the rendition of a service in the expectation
that the one who ordered the certificate would use it thereafter in the
operations of his business as occasion might require. Here was a case
where the transmission of the certificate to another was not merely one
possibility among many, but the "end and aim of the transaction," as
certain and immediate and deliberately willed as if a husband were to
order a gown to be delivered to his wife, or a telegraph company, con-
tracting with the sender of a message, were to telegraph it wrongly to the
damage of the person expected to receive it.31
Although the court held that the accountants were not liable for negligent
misrepresentation outside the boundaries of contractual privity, Justice Car-
dozo noted that:
The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.
How far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite subject of juridical
33. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
34. Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
35. Id. at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442.
36. Id. at 174, 174 N.E. at 442.
37. Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 443.
38. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
39. Id. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 36:41
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discussion. In the field of the law of contract there has been a gradual
widening of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, until today
the beneficiary of a promise, clearly designated as such, is seldom left
without a remedy. Even in that field, however, the remedy is narrower
where the beneficiaries of the promise are indeterminate or general. Some-
thing more must then appear than an intention that the promise shall
redound to the benefit of the public or to that of a class of indefinite
extension. The promise must be such as to "bespeak the assumption of a
duty to make reparation directly to the individual members of the public
if the benefit is lost.' ' 40
The assault upon privity acknowledged by Justice Cardozo in 1931 has
continued to the present day. In a post-industrial society, this development
is most pronounced in the field of product liability. Today, persons injured
by almost any manufactured product have theories available upon which to
posit a claim, due primarily to creative plaintiff's attorneys and courts that
are receptive to using tort concepts as a surrogate for social insurance.
II. PRIVITY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY
For sixty years following the Winterbottom decision, few inroads were
made on the requirement of privity for liability for physical damage caused
by a manufacturer's negligence. For example, in Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling
Works, 41 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that privity was not required
for a plaintiff to bring a cause of action sounding in negligence against a
manufacturer for injury resulting from food or drink. 42 The court abolished
privity in this situation because of the danger to health or life that can result
from the lack of care in the preparation of food and beverages .4 Aside from
this very limited exception for imminently dangerous products, privity re-
mained the rule with regard to the manufacturer's product.
As noted above, New York virtually abolished the holding in Winterbottom
in the 1916 MacPherson decision, which held that a plaintiff suffering
physical harm could sue an auto manufacturer for negligence despite the
fact that the two parties were not in privity. 4 In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Cardozo recognized that the circumstances giving rise to a duty of
care will change with the needs of society.45
This observation reflected the dramatic shift from an agricultural-based
economy to a more urbanized, industrialized nation then occurring in this
country. Certainly, a basic reason that manufacturers lost their treasured
protection of privity was due to a growing concern for and awareness of
40. Id. at 180-81, 174 N.E. at 445 (citations omitted).
41. 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80 (1914).
42. Id. at 30-31, 177 S.W. at 81.
43. Id. at 28, 177 S.W. at 81.
44. MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 394, 111 N.E. at 1054. See supra notes 14-15 and accom-
panying text.
45. MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 391, III N.E. at 1053.
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consumer safety and protection. By 1916, the industrialization of the nation
combined with the development of ever larger companies and mass produced
products reduced the "protectionist" sentiment for manufacturers found in
cases such as Winterbottom. Thus, for the first time in American history,
manufacturers were widely exposed to liability in suits brought by consumers
claiming negligence.
MacPherson also set the stage for courts to impose higher and more
stringent standards of care on manufacturers by allowing those not in privity
to pursue contract remedies. Specifically, this was accomplished through
breach of warranty claims.4 6 For example, in 1932, the Supreme Court of
Washington, in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 47 was the first court to recognize
that a plaintiff not in privity with the defendant-manufacturer could sue the
manufacturer for breach of an express warranty."'
In 1960, the Uniform Commercial Code requirement of privity for the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose
was discarded in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.49 In Henningsen,
the plaintiff was injured when the steering wheel failed on the car she was
driving. The plaintiff's husband had purchased the auto from a car dealer.
The court stated:
[W]here the commodities sold are such that if defectively manufactured
they will be dangerous to life or limb, then society's interests can only be
protected by eliminating the requirement of privity between the maker and
his dealers and the reasonably expected ultimate consumer. In that way
the burden of losses consequent upon use of defective articles is borne by
those who are in a position to either control the danger or make an
equitable distribution of the losses when they do occur. 0
Henningsen was the first United States case to find a manufacturer liable to
third parties for breach of implied warranties. 5
Three years later, the California Supreme Court made the injured con-
sumer's burden even lighter by breaking out of contract-based theory to
create the independent cause of action of strict liability in tort. In Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.5 2 Justice Traynor explained the reasons for
46. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
47. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
48. Id. at 463, 12 P.2d at 412.
49. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
50. Id. at 379, 161 A.2d at 81.
51. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV.
791 (1966). According to Dean Prosser, Henningsen reflects the fall of Cardozo's "citadel
of privity in products liability." Prosser wrote: "In the field of products liability, the date of
the fall of the citadel of privity can be fixed with some certainty. It was May 9, 1960, when
the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced the decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.". Wheeler, A Brief History of the Development of Modern Product Liability Law, 183
P.L.I. LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE 15, 22 (1981).
52. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
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imposing strict product liability in tort on the manufacturer: "The purpose
of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves."5 3
The recognition in product liability cases that injured parties can recover
both personal and economic losses suffered from a defective product is
instructive to providers of services. Important, too, is the development of a
duty imposed on manufacturers to warn the public of the dangerous pro-
pensities of a product. The duty to warn, grounded in concepts of misrep-
resentation and disclosure, requires manufacturers to not only make safe
products, but also to fully warn potential users of dangerous propensities.
5 4
As society has become more sophisticated and more dependent on tech-
nologically or chemically complex products, and as society has become more
sophisticated in its ability to trace maladies to various sources-such as
asbestos, Agent Orange, fertility and birth control drugs-the courts have
been willing to fashion remedies for the injured. Similar developments can
be expected for service providers such as accountants and lawyers.
III. PRIVITY AND THE ACCOUNTANT
In recent years, courts have reexamined the privity rule articulated in
Ultramares in which Justice Cardozo expressed concern that the imposition
of liability for negligent misrepresentation could threaten the viability of the
accounting profession."
The initial deviation from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares came
in 1968 in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin.16 In Rusch, a New York plaintiff
loaned a Rhode Island corporation over $337,000. Plaintiff made these loans
based upon financial statements certified by the defendant-accounting firm.
Although the financial statements showed the Rhode Island corporation to
be in sound financial condition, the corporation soon went into bankruptcy .
7
Plaintiff filed suit against the accountant, alleging negligent preparation of
53. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701; Wheeler, A Brief History of the
Development of Modern Product Liability Law, 183 P.L.1. LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE 15, 23 (1981). Barely twenty years later, product liability law has become one of the
major sources of civil litigation. Law school tort classes in the 1960s scarcely devoted any time
to product liability law, while today law schools offer whole courses to the discipline with
treatises and case books devoted solely to the subject.
54. Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980) (in strict liability
claim, requirement that plaintiff allege and prove that defendant knew or should have known
of danger is limited to complaints that allege breach of the duty to adequately warn).
55. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
56. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968). See generally Note, Public Accountants andAttorneys,
supra note 16 (detailed case-by-case analysis of development of accountant liability to third
parties).
57. Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 86-87.
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the financial statements.58 Citing Ultramares, the defendant immediately
moved to dismiss the suit, claiming that plaintiff could not sue him because
the two were not in privity of contract.5 9
The Rusch court recognized the precedential weight of Ultramares,60 but
nevertheless criticized the decision:
The wisdom of the decision in Ultramares has been doubted . . . and this
Court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliant party be forced
to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional malpractice?
Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing
it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against
the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the entire
consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the
cautionary techniques of the accounting profession? For these reasons, it
appears to this Court that the decision in Ultramares constitutes an un-
warranted inroad upon the principle that "[tihe risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed. ' ' 61
The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and held that accountants
should be liable for negligent misrepresentations relied upon "by actually
foreseen and limited classes of persons." '62 However, the court reserved until
trial the question of whether to extend an accountant's liability to the full
limits of foreseeability. 63
Rusch was the first opinion to hold an accountant liable to third parties
for negligent preparation of financial statements. 64 Although the court did
not address the question of whether to extend liability of accountants to the
full limits of foreseeability, it nevertheless greatly broadened accountants'
exposure to liability in the absence of privity. Rusch was soon followed by
the Iowa Supreme Court in Ryan v. Kanne.65
58. Id. at 87.
59. Id.
60. The court stated, "The reluctance of the courts to hold the accounting profession to
an obligation of care which extends to all reasonably foreseeable reliant parties is predicated
upon the social utility rationale first articulated by Judge Cardozo in the Ultramares case." Id.
at 90.
61. Id. at 90-91 (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E.
99, 100 (1928)) (citations omitted). The court then proceeded to find that the facts in Rusch
were qualitatively distinguishable from Ultramares. The court properly observed that in Ultra-
mares, "the plaintiff was a member of an undefined, unlimited class of remote leaders and
potential equity holders not actually foreseen but only foreseeable." Id. at 91. The plaintiff in
Rusch, however, was "a single party whose reliance was actually foreseen by the defendant."
Id. Thus, the court found this case far more analogous to Glanzer than to Ultramares.
62. Id. at 93.
63. Id.; Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys, supra note 16, at 598-99.
64. Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 90; Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys, supra note 16,
at 598.
65. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
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Factually similar to Rusch, 66 Ryan criticized the rationale of Ultramares,
stating that accountants should accept legal responsibility to known third
parties who reasonably rely on financial statements negligently prepared and
submitted. 67 The court based this holding on the rationale of Rusch,
68
Glanzer 9 and section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.70 Ryan, like
66. Ryan was an action seeking recovery of fees filed by plaintiff-accountants, followed
by a counterclaim back by one of the defendants, Kanne Lumber and Supply, Inc. Defendant
James A. Kanne, owner of the lumber business, had hired the plaintiff-accountants to prepare
his financial statement. Defendant informed plaintiffs that a corporation interested in taking
over his business would examine the financial statement and therefore cautioned plaintiffs to
"[ulse every conceivable means to determine the accounts payable." Id. at 397. Plaintiffs
guaranteed that the accounts payable figure reflected on the financial statement was accurate
within $5,000. In examining accounts payable, however, plaintiffs reviewed nine months of
records rather than the twelve months that defendant had requested. As a result, plaintiffs'
financial statement showed that defendant had a net worth of almost $45,000 when, in fact,
defendant's business was over $5,000 in deficit.
The Supreme Court of Iowa affi -med the trial court's decision holding that plaintiffs were
negligent in their examination, preparation, and submission of the defendant's financial state-
ment. The court stated that the lack of privity was not a valid defense to a claim for damages
based upon the accountants' negligence. As the court explained, "We know of no good
reason why accountants should not accept the legal responsibility to know third parties who
reasonably rely upon financial statements prepared and submitted by them." Id. at 401.
67. Id. at 401. The court stated:
When the accountant is aware that the balance sheet to be prepared is to be
used by a certain party or parties who will rely thereon in extending credit or in
assuming liability for obligations of the party audited, the lack of privity should be
no valid defense to a claim for damages due to the accountant's negligence. We
know of no good reason why accountants should not accept the legal responsibility
to know third parties who reasonably rely upon financial statements prepared and
submitted by them.
68. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
70. The Restatement provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or a
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon such information if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating thp
information.(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsection
(1) is limited to loss suffered:
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends
to supply it; and (b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially
similar transaction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977), cited in Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 403. In White v.
Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 316 (1977), the court applied the Glanzer rationale
to hold an accountant liable to limited partners in a tax shelter offering. In later cases, New
York courts have been unwilling to extend accountant liability beyond Glanzer and have con-
strued White quite narrowly. But see discussion in Quintel Corp., N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., 589
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Rusch, did not determine whether liability should be extended to the full
limits of foreseeability because resolution of that issue was not necessary to
the outcome of the case. 7'
The major break from Ultramares came in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,72
a 1983 New Jersey Supreme Court decision. The Rosenblum plaintiffs claimed
that they relied on audits of Giant Stores, Inc. in deciding to accept Giant
common stock in exchange for the sale of their business to Giant. 73 Even-
tually, it was discovered that the financial statements were fraudulent and
Giant's common stock was worthless. 74 Plaintiffs asserted that Touche Ross
& Company's negligent misconduct in performing the audit of Giant was
the cause of their financial loss. 7 The court held:
When the independent auditor furnishes an opinion with no limitation in
the certificate as to whom the company may disseminate the financial
statements, he has a duty to all those whom that auditor should reasonably
foresee as recipients from the company of the statements for its proper
business purposes, provided that the recipients rely on the statements
pursuant to those business purposes.76
To reach this landmark result, the unanimous court reviewed the history
of accountant liability from Ultramares, the development of liability of
product manufacturers 77 and the role of the accountant in modern day
F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (separate counsel for limited partner could not establish breach
of duty by law firm representing limited partnership because no facts were alleged to support
attorney-client relationship between the firm and the limited partner, there being no privity be-
tween the two nor any reasonable foreseeability that the limited partner would rely on the part-
nership's counsel to act as partner's lawyer).
71. Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 403. Damages were limited to the difference between the
reported and actual amounts payable minus the margin of error guaranteed by defendant, plus
the reasonable cost of securing the corrected statement. Id. at 407. See generally Gormley, The
Foreseen, the Foreseeable, and Beyond-Accountants' Liability to Nonclients, 14 SETON HALL
528 (1984) (exploration of the evolution of law governing accountants' liability to third parties
and prediction of how recent developments and court decisions may affect the accounting
profession).
72. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983). Coincidentally, Touche Ross & Co. was the
defendant in this action, as in Ultramares (each individual Touche Ross partner was named
and served in this action; hence, the case caption). It is submitted that Rosenblum reflects the
beginning of the decline, if not yet the actual obliteration, of the citadel of privity for
accountants.
73. Id. at 329, 461 A.2d at 140.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153.
77. Id. at 334-41, 461 A.2d at 142-47. The court went on to say:
Why should a claim of negligent misrepresentation be barred in the absence of
privity when no such limit is imposed where the plaintiff's claim also sounds in
tort, but is based on liability for defects in products arising out of a negligent
misrepresentation? If recovery for defective products may include economic loss,
why should such loss not be compensable if caused by negligent misrepresentation?
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financial markets. 7 The court noted that audits are no longer solely for
management's use 79 and concluded, "The auditor's function has expanded
from that of a watchdog for management to an independent evaluator of
the adequacy and fairness of financial statements issued by management to-
stockholders, creditors and others. '"80 The court explicitly acknowledged that
accountants are critical to the financial marketplaces of the nation's econ-
omy.,1
Less than a month after Rosenblum, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., S.C.,12 issued a similar
decision. Timm explicitly rejected the limitations of the Restatement as too
restrictive.83 The court relied on Auric v. Continental Casualty Co,8 4 which
had held an attorney liable to a will beneficiary not in privity with the
attorney for negligent supervision of the execution of a will. 5 Auric reasoned
that imposition of liability on attorneys would result in careful fulfillment
of their duties to clients.8 6 Timm concluded that Auric's rationale was
applicable and offered additional policy reasons for the imposition of liability
on accountants:
The maker of the product and the person making a written representation with
intent that it be relied upon are, respectively, impliedly holding out that the product
is reasonably fit, suitable and safe and that the representation is reasonably suffi-
cient, suitable and accurate. The fundamental issue is whether there should be any
duty to respond in damages for economic loss owed to a foreseeable user neither in
privity with the declarant nor intended by the declarant to be the user of the
statement or opinion.
Id. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147.
78. Id. at 332-47, 461 A.2d at 142-50.
79. Id. at 346, 461 A.2d at 149.
80. Id. For a contrary discussion on the impact of liability on accountants, see Briggs
v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1175-77 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
81. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 342-43, 461 A.2d at 147-48.
82. 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
83. Id. at 386, 335 N.W.2d at 366. In Timm, the accounting firm prepared financial
statements for Clintonville Fine Apparatus, Inc. (CFA) which included a comparative state-
ment of financial condition, a statement of yearly income, and a statement of changes in
financial position. Additionally, the firm sent an opinion letter to its client "which stated that
the financial statements fairly presented the financial condition of CFA and that the statements
were prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles." The plaintiff-bank
made a $300,000 loan to CFA in 1975 after reviewing the financial statements defendant had
prepared. Additional loans were made in 1976. In 1977, while preparing CFA's financial
statement for 1976, defendant discovered that the 1974 and 1975 statements contained errors
approximating $400,000. The defendant corrected the errors and informed the plaintiff which
called all of its loans due. CFA consequently went into receivership and was liquidated and
dissolved. As of the date the complaint was filed, CFA's outstanding loans exceeded $150,000.00.
Id. at 378-79, 335 N.W.2d at 362.
84. 111 Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983).
85. Timm, 113 Wis. 2d at 384, 335 N.W.2d at 365 (citing Auric, 111 Wis. 2d at 514,
331 N.W.2d at 327).
86. Id. (citing Auric, 111 Wis. 2d at 513, 331 N.W.2d at 328).
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If relying third parties, such as creditors, are not allowed to recover, the
cost of credit to the general public will increase because creditors will
either have to absorb the costs of bad loans made in reliance on faulty
information or hire independent accountants to verify the information
received. Accountants may spread the risk through the use of liability
insurance."
Building on Timm and Rosenblum, a California appellate court early in
1986 held that an independent auditor owed a duty of due care to reason-
ably foreseeable plaintiffs who relied on negligently prepared audited
financial statements.88 The court concluded that the Ultramares rule pro-
tecting accountants from liability in the absence of privity was no longer
valid because of the changed role of the accountant in modern society. 9 The
court reasoned that the burden of the professional's malpractice should more
appropriately be placed on the accounting profession rather than on the
plaintiff because the profession is capable of passing the risk to its customers
and the public. Such a shift of the risk of loss would, according to the
court, provide "a financial disincentive for negligent conduct and will heighten
the profession's cautionary techniques." 90
Although abolition of the privity requirement has not yet been accepted
by all jurisdictions for accountant negligence, the trend is clear. With the
growing realization that economic harm is as deserving of recompense as
physical harm, it can be expected that courts will continue to expand
accountant liability. Accountants will soon lose the benefits of the privity
defense due to policy concerns for third parties who are economically harmed
by accountant negligence.
87. Id. at 384, 335 N.W.2d at 365.
88. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d
806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986). In International Mortgage Co.. the defendant accounting firm
entered into an agreement with Westside Mortgage Inc. to audit its financial statements for
1978. Defendant issued an unqualified audited financial statement in March 1979 and listed
Westside's corporate net worth at $175,000. The primary asset of the company was a $100,000
note secured by a deed of trust on real property. The footnotes to the statement indicated that
the fair market value of the realty was $115,000.00 The note was, in fact, worthless since the
deed of trust had been rendered invalid by a prior foreclosure of a superior deed of trust at a
trustee's sale in 1977.
Plaintiff approached Westside "for the purpose of buying and selling loans on the secon-
dary market." Westside provided plaintiff with copies of its financial reports from defendant.
Without the note secured by the deed, Westside was capitalized at under $100,000 and,
therefore, was not qualified to do business in the FHA loans included in its agreement with
plaintiff. Defendant was aware at the time of the audit that Westside needed a capitalization of
at least $100,000 to qualify for FHA business. In 1980, Westside entered into a series of con-
tracts to sell government loans to plaintiff. However, it failed to deliver the trust deeds, caus-
ing a loss to plaintiff of $475,000. Westside issued a promissory note for the amount in ques-
tion. It paid $40,000 and defaulted on the balance. Id. at 809-10, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219-20.
89. Id. at 812, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
90. Id. at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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IV. PRIVITY AND THE ATTORNEY
Three early California decisions forged the way in extending the scope of
attorney liability beyond the bounds of contractual privity.9 1 In Biakanja v.
Irving, 9 the California Supreme Court held that a notary public who agreed
to prepare a will could be held liable to the intended beneficiaries of the
will despite the absence of contractual privity.9 a The court recognized a duty
to an intended beneficiary outside the bounds of a contractual relationship.9
4
The court held that the determination of liability to third parties in the
absence of privity is a matter of public policy in which various factors must
be balanced: 1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff; 2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; 3) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; 4) the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered; 5) the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct; and 6) the policy of preventing future
harm. 95 The court concluded that, in the context of a negligently drafted
will, the "end and aim" of the transaction was to provide for the passage
of the estate to the intended beneficiaries. 96 Here, Justice Cardozo's reasoning
in Glanzer resurfaced in that third party liability was held appropriate where
the very purpose of the transaction was to benefit the third person.9 7
Three years after Biakanja, the California Supreme Court reached the
same conclusion in a case involving negligent drafting of a will. In Lucas v.
Hamm,9" the court ruled that the factors that had led Biakanja to extend
liability of a notary public beyond contractual privity were equally applicable
in a case involving an attorney. 99 Because the defendant in Lucas was a
91. See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
92. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
93. Id. at 651, 320 P.2d at 19.
94. The court expressed disapproval of Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895),
an 1895 case that had relied on Ward, in reaching the contrary result in the context of a suit
brought by an intended beneficiary. Biakanja, 49 Cal. 2d at 648-49, 320 P.2d at 18. See supra
notes 17-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ward. The court noted that at the time
of the decision in Buckley, with few exceptions, there was no liability for negligence committed
in the performance of a contract without privity. The court recognized that since that time,
however, courts had liberalized the privity rule to a significant extent in other areas of the law
such as products liability. Biakania, 49 Cal. 2d at 648-49, 320 P.2d at 18. The court stated:
"Liability has been imposed, in the absence of privity, upon suppliers of goods and services
which, if negligently made or rendered, are 'reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril."
Id. at 649, 320 P.2d at 18 (citing MacPherson 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E 1050, 1053 (N.Y.
1916)).
95. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
96. Id.
97. Id. As Justice Cardozo stated in Glanzer, 233 N.Y. 236, 242, 135 N.E. 275, 277
1922): "Diligence was owing, not only to him who ordered, but to him who also relied."
98. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
99. Id. at 588-59, 364 P.2d at 687-88, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24. Biakanja involved a
notary who was not a licensed attorney. Id. at 588, 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823. In
1986]
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licensed attorney, the court considered the additional factor of whether the
extension of liability would impose an undue burden on the legal profes-
sion. °° The court concluded that, although the extension of liability could
be extensive and unpredictable, it would not place an undue burden on the
profession, particularly where a contrary conclusion would place the entire
burden of loss on an innocent plaintiff.10 Lucas noted that an intended
beneficiary of a will could recover as a third party beneficiary to the contract
between the attorney and client, and also recognized a duty sounding in
tort. 102
In Heyer v. Flaig,03 the California Supreme Court ruled that the availa-
bility of a contractual third party beneficiary remedy is conceptually super-
fluous in light of the fact that the heart of the Lucas decision recognized
recovery in tort for a breach of a duty owed directly to a third party.'
°4
The California Supreme Court next addressed the issue of liability to third
parties arising out of the rendering of legal advice. Goodman v. Kennedy'05
addressed the question of whether an attorney's duty of care in rendering
legal advice extends to persons with whom the attorney's client deals at
arm's length. In Goodman, plaintiff-stock purchasers alleged that the defend-
ant-attorney had negligently advised corporate officers that certain shares of
their company's stock could be issued to them as dividends and sold to third
parties without jeopardizing a statutory registration exemption. '6 The advice
proved to be incorrect, and the plaintiff-purchasers suffered damages re-
sulting from a decline in the value of the stock when the exemption was
disqualified.' 0 7 The court concluded that an attorney owes no such duty in
Lucas, the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust brought action for damages against the at-
torney who had prepared the will. Defendant-attorney negligently prepared testamentary in-
struments resulting in monetary loss to plaintiffs. Id. at 586, 364 P.2d at 686-87, 15 Cal. Rptr.
at 822.
100. Id. at 589, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
101. Id. However, the defendant was not held liable either to his client or to a beneficiary
under a will for the errors of the kind alleged. Id. at 591, 364 P.2d at 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. at
825.
102. Id. As the court explained:
Since, in a situation like those presented here and in the Buckley case, the main
purpose of the testator in making his agreement with the attorney is to benefit the
persons named in his will and this intent can be effectuated, in the event of a
breach by the attorney, only by giving the beneficiaries a right of action, we should
recognize, as a matter of policy, that they are entitled to recover as third party
beneficiaries.
Id.
103. 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
104. Id. at 226-29, 449 P.2d at 164-65, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 227-29. In Heyer, plaintiffs
brought an action under a negligence theory against an attorney for failure to advise testatrix
of the consequences of a post-testamentary marriage and failure to include in a will any provi-
sion related to intended marriage. Id. at 224-25, 449 P.2d at 162-63, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
105. 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
106. Id. at 339, 556 P.2d at 740, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
107. Id.-
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the absence of a showing that the legal advice was foreseeably transmitted
to or relied on by a third party or that the third party was an intended
beneficiary of a transaction to which the advice pertained. 08
Goodman rejected the purchasers' claims because the defendant had no
relationship with the plaintiffs that would result in a duty of care arising
out of advice to his client.' °9 The court noted that there was no indication
that the attorney's advice was ever communicated to the plaintiffs or that
the plaintiffs relied on this advice in purchasing the stock." 0 Furthermore,
the court pointed out that the advice was not given for the purpose of
enabling the clients to discharge any obligation to the plaintiffs."' The court
also noted the risk that a contrary result would inject undesirable self-
protective reservations into the attorney's counseling role. The attorney could
become preoccupied with the possibility of claims based on negligence by
anyone with whom the client might deal. This could hinder the attorney's
devotion of energies to the client, resulting in "an undue burden on the
profession." Consequently, the court reasoned, the quality of legal services
received by the client would be diminished." 2
The California Supreme Court was careful to distinguish Goodman from
a situation where legal advice is foreseeably transmitted or relied on by a
third party." 3 In Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz," 4 a plaintiff
creditor was alleged to have been induced to make substantial loans to a
partnership on the basis of a letter given to a member of the partnership by
the defendant-attorneys.' 5 The letter stated that in the law firm's professional
108. Id. at 343-44, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 345, 556 P.2d at 744, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 382
ill. Id. at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381. The court stated:
[P]laintiffs were not persons upon who defendant's clients had any wish or
obligation to confer a benefit in the transaction. Plaintiffs' only relationship to the
proposed transaction was that of parties with whom the defendant's clients might
negotiate a bargain at arm's length. Any buyer's "potential advantage" from the
possible purchase of the stock "was only a collateral consideration of the transac-
tion" . . . and did not put such potential buyers into any relationship with defendant
as "intended beneficiaries" of his clients' anticipated sales.
Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 343 n.4, 556 P.2d at 743 n.4, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381 n.4. The Goodman court
explained:
We are therefore not concerned with such cases as Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart,
Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 110-111, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976), in
which an attorney gives his client a written opinion with the intention that it be
transmitted to and relied upon by the plaintiff in dealing with the client. In that
situation, the attorney owes the plaintiff a duty of care in providing the advice
because the plaintiff's anticipated reliance upon it is "the end and aim of the
transaction" (Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 238-239, 135, N.E. 275) (1922)).
Id.
114. 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976).
115. Id. at 108, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
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opinion, the partnership was a general partnership consisting of fourteen
members. The plaintiff-creditor subsequently sustained damages in an attempt
to establish the liability of the partners as general partners. 1 6 The court
concluded that the harm to the plaintiff was clearly foreseeable since the
purpose of the opinion concerning the partner status was given to influence
the plaintiff's conduct." 7
From these relatively early California decisions, lawyer liability to third
parties has developed slowly. The reluctance of courts to extend lawyer
liability reflects concern over compromising the attorney's counseling and
advisory role as an advocate and representative of an individual client's
interests." 8 For example, in Pelham v. Griesheimer,"9 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that although privity of contract is not an indispensable element
in establishing a duty of care between a non-client and an attorney in a suit
for legal malpractice, the better approach is to require that plaintiffs allege
and prove that the intent of the client to benefit the non-client third party
was the primary or direct purpose of the transaction or relationship. 20 In
Pelham, the children of divorced parents brought an action against their
mother's attorney. The children alleged that the attorney negligently failed
to take steps necessary to have them named beneficiaries of their father's
group life insurance policy as required by a divorce decree. Following the
divorce, the father died, the new wife collected the policy benefits.' 2 ' The
key consideration, according to the court, was whether the attorney acted at
the direction or on behalf of the client to benefit or influence a third
party. 22
Although Pelham acknowledged that the analogy to a contractual third
party direct beneficiary provides for a narrower scope of liability than the
balancing approach used in California, the court maintained that even under
the California test the predominant inquiry is generally the extent to which
services are intended to affect the third party.' 23 The court acknowledged
that under either theory courts are far less inclined to extend an attorney's
116. Id.
117. Id. at 111-12, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
118. Some courts have rejected extension of the lawyer's liability to anyone beyond the
client. See First Mun. Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin and Stewart, 648
S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App. 1983) (attorney owes no duty to third party in absence of privity of
contract). See also Chalpin v. Brennan, 559 P.2d 680 (Ariz. 1977) (no cause of action for
malpractice to an individual who is not a client or in privity with the attorney), criticized in
Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984) (express disapproval
of blanket denials without the use of a foreseeability standard); Page v. Frazier, 383 Mass. 55,
445 N.E.2d 148 (1983) (attorney not liable to mortgagors given lack of contractual relation).
119. 92 111. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982).
120. Id. at 24-25, 440 N.E.2d at 99.
121. Id. at 16-17, 440 N.E.2d at 97.
122. Id. at 21, 440 N.E.2d at 100.
123. Id. at 22, 440 N.E.2d at 100.
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duty to non-clients in an adversarial context.1 24 This results from a concern
that, where a client's interests are involved in an adversarial setting, an
extension of a duty to a third party would interfere with the undivided
loyalty that an attorney owes a client and would detract from achieving the
most advantageous position for a client. 125 Accordingly, the court held that
in cases of an adversarial nature, an intent to directly confer a benefit on a
third party must clearly be shown. 12 6
Pelham concluded that, under its test, the plaintiffs had failed to establish
the existence of a duty between the parties. In reaching its conclusion, the
court reasoned that the attorney had been hired primarily to obtain a divorce
and related relief for the client rather than to represent the interests of the
children. 27 Given the potential for conflicting interests, the court refused to
impose a duty in the absence of a clear intent to benefit the children. Pelham
noted that its conclusion could have been different had plaintiffs alleged
that the attorney had undertaken to notify the insurance carrier or employer
of the terms of the divorce decree.'28
In 1983, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dealt with the issue of attorney
liability to third parties in Guy v. Liederbach.29 The court recognized that
important policies mandated the preservation of the privity requirement in
a negligence action for professional malpractice. Nevertheless, it held that a
plaintiff could bring suit as an intended third party beneficiary of a contract
between an attorney and a testator for negligent drafting of a will that
specifically named the plaintiff as a recipient of the estate. 30 The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court was persuaded not to abandon the requirement of
contractual privity in professional malpractice actions based on negligence
by what it perceived as ad hoc determinations and inconsistent results in the
California courts, as well as the policy considerations originally expressed
by Justice Cardozo in Ultramares. '3' The Pennsylvania court, however,
declined to elaborate on why these considerations led to its conclusion. 32
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 23, 440 N.E.2d at 100.
127. Id. at 19, 440 N.E.2d at 99.
128. Id. at 24, 440 N.E.2d at 101.
129. 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983).
130. Id. at 63, 459 A.2d at 752-53.
131. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
132. A dissenting opinion in Guy notes that the majority's reliance on the policy concerns
expressed in Ultramares is anomalous, considering that the New York Court of Appeals held
that those policies are inapplicable where the negligence of a professional is directed to a known
third party. The policy concerns expressed by Justice Cardozo dealt with the potential hazards
of liability to an indeterminate class. Putting aside the continuing validity of this rule, it is
clear that not every third party will be a member of such a class. The clearest example involves
cases similar to the one in Guy. Intended beneficiaries are clearly identifiable at the time a will
is drafted. Consequently, Ultramares is simply not relevant. Guy, 501 Pa. at 68, 459 A.2d at
755-56 (McDermott, J., dissenting).
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While the Supreme Courts of Illinois and Pennsylvania have been reluctant
to expand lawyer liability, other courts have not shared in this reluctance."'
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Eisenberg v. Gagnon,'a4 found that an attorney could be held liable to tax
shelter investors based upon an opinion that certain tax deductions were
available under applicable law.' 35 Following the reasoning of the recent cases
involving accountants, the court held that the attorney's liability for negligent
misrepresentations extended to a class of persons intended to rely on those
misrepresentations. 3 6 Similarly, in Bradford Security Processing Services,
Inc. v. Plaza Bank & Trust, a7 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that bond
counsel could be held responsible to a pledgee of the bonds for a faulty
opinion so long as the pledgee was among the class of persons whose reliance
the lawyer could reasonably foresee.'38
In a case that reflects the uncertainty of courts today over the scope of
lawyer liability, a federal district judge, in Hackett v. Village Court Asso-
ciates,3 9 was asked to apply Wisconsin law in a lawyer malpractice claim. 40
Investors sought to recover from a limited partnership's law firm for alleged
misrepresentations and malpractice.' 4' The court reviewed Wisconsin law,
including the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Timm, 142 which extended
accountant liability to foreseeable third parties. The court declined to "push
Wisconsin law beyond its present frontiers," reasoning that a sufficiently
compelling public policy did not exist in a commercial setting involving
securities to justify an extension of liability. 43
Would the break be so dramatic? The answer appears to be no. Only one
case in the last several years has broken the trend to expand third party
133. See Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 115, 492 A.2d 618 (1985) (Maryland Supreme
Court adopted the third party beneficiary approach of Illinois and Pennsylvania). See also
Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (attorney not liable to third party
investors when the investors were foreseeable but not actually foreseen by attorney at time of
allegedly negligent dispensation of legal advice); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978)
(in order to proceed successfully in legal malpractice action, third party must be a direct and
intended beneficiary of lawyer's services).
134. 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985).
135. Id. at 779-80.
136. Id.
137. 653 P.2d 188 (Okla. 1982).
138. Id. at 191.
139. 602 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
140. Id. at 857-58.
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
143. Hackett, 602 F. Supp. at 858.
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liability for attorneys.'" The courts implicitly acknowledge the varying roles
of the attorney. 45
Outside the area of the lawyer as advocate-and particularly in situations
involving lawyer opinions-it is difficult to see how lawyer liability will not
soon reach the limits of foreseeability. It is a small step for courts like the
Illinois and Wisconsin Supreme Courts to so extend lawyer responsibility.
For example, the Illinois Supreme Court in Pelham v. Griesheimer46
required that, in order for an attorney to be liable to a third party, the
conduct must have been intended to benefit or influence the third party. 47
Under Pelham, an attorney who rendered an opinion to help a client obtain
a loan would arguably have a duty to the potential lender. 4' Although the
representation of the client certainly is not intended to benefit the lender,
the particular action of writing the opinion could effectively influence the
lender to provide money to the attorney's client. The argument could be
made that such conduct by a lawyer would fall within the scope of the duty
to third parties established in Pelham.
Whether the party to be benefited must be known at the time of the
representation is an open question. Pelham can be read to limit the duty to
known persons. Yet, the policy for requiring an intent to benefit or influence
would be undercut if only identified persons could recover. For example,
what if the lawyer in the Pelham situation knows his or her opinion will be
144. See First Mun. Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin and Stewart,
648 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App. 1983) (where attorneys had been hired by assignors of an equipment
lease to issue opinion as to validity of sales contract, corporation could not recover because
opinion was issued after corporation took assignment and thus there could have been no reliance
on opinion of attorneys).
145. For example, the privity requirement has been virtually abandoned with respect to
suits brought against attorneys by the intended beneficiaries of negligently drawn wills. See,
e.g., Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060 (D.C. 1983) (intended beneficiary of will could
bring malpractice cause of action against drafting attorneys despite lack of privity between
attorneys and beneficiary) and cases citied therein. With the exception of New York and
Nebraska, no jurisdiction that has recently addressed the issue has denied recovery to an
intended beneficiary based on the absence of privity. See Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685,
344 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1973) (absent privity of contract, omission by attorney to prepare new will
or codicil naming new beneficiary of some part of decedent's estate did not by itself, render
attorney liable to alleged beneficiary), aff'd, 43 A.D.2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1974); Lilyhorn
v. Dier, 214 Neb. 727, 335 N.W.2d 554 (1983) (where no attorney-client relationship existed
between attorney and heir with respect to drafting a will, attorney owed no duty to heir to
exercise reasonable care or skill in drafting of will); St. Mary's Church of Schuyler v. Tomek,
212 Neb. 728, 325 N.W.2d 164 (1982) (attorney who prepared testator's last will and testament
owed no duty to purported beneficiaries of the will); Ames Bank v. Hahn, 205 Neb. 353, 287
N.W.2d 687 (1980) (lawyer owes duty to his client to use reasonable care and skill in the
discharge of duties but ordinarily this duty does not extend to third parties).
146. 92 I11. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982). See supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 21, 440 N.E.2d at 100.
148. Id. at 22, 440 N.E.2d at 100.
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delivered to a potential lender to help obtain a one-million dollar loan but
does not know that the client submitted the opinion to a second lender and
received part of the desired total from each institution? Little reasoned
difference can be drawn between the two lenders, and the attorney was not
compromised by the presence of the second lender. 49
A lawyer's opinion in connection with securities offerings is as central to
the integrity of the process as is an auditor's certification. It is difficult to
see how the analysis of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rosenblum' ° will
not be largely applicable to tax or other legal opinions given in connection
with a securities offering, whether public or private. Like the accountant,
the attorney faces liability under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for
opinions given. 5' This liability was a factor noted by the New Jersey court.'52
Also important was the recognition by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) and the court of the key role accountants play in the integrity
of the securities markets.'
For lawyers, the role is rightly viewed as being even more crucial. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals wrote in Securities and Exchange Com-
mission v. Spectrum:'"
The legal profession plays a unique and pivotal role in the effective
implementation of securities laws. Questions of compliance with the intri-
cate provisions of these statutes are ever present and the smooth func-
tioning of the securities markets will be seriously disturbed if the public
cannot rely on the expertise proffered by an attorney when he renders an
opinion on such matters.'55
In 1974, SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr., stated:
We are consistently reminded that historically the attorney has been an
advocate, that his professional ethics have over the years defined his
function in those terms that such a role includes unremitting loyalty to
the interests of his client (short of engaging in or countenancing fraud).
Whenever the effort is made to analogize the responsibilities of the attorney
to those of the independent auditor, one is reminded that the federal
securities law system conceives of the auditor as independent and defines
his role specifically, whereas the attorney is not and cannot be independent.
It has been asserted by very eminent counsel that, "The law, so far [this
was in 1969], is very clear. The lawyers' responsibility is exclusively to
their own client." If this distinction is clear to lawyers, it is less clear to
others.
149. Similar situations exist in the context of wills and trusts. Should a distinction exist
between the rights of a known named legateefand the children of deceased named legatee whose
gifl was given per slirpes?
150. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
151. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k (West Supp. 1981).
152. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 348-49, 461 A.2d at 151.
153. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78r (West Supp. 1981); Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 348, 461 A.2d at 151.
154. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
155. Id. at 541-42.
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I would suggest that the security bar's conception of its role too sharply
contrasts with the reality of its role in the securities process to escape
notice and attention-and in such situations the reality eventually prevails.
Lawyers are not paid in the amounts they are to put the representations
of their clients in good English, or give opinions which assume a pure
state of facts upon which any third year law student could confidently
express an opinion.16
Therefore, in the role of evaluator (as stated in the Model Rules) or opinion
giver, it seems inevitable that lawyer liability will be extended in the coming
years to the limits of foreseeability.
Not as clear, however, is the liability of the lawyer as advocate and in the
somewhat grayer area of negotiator. To be sure, the requirement of privity
remains the absolute standard in suits brought by non-clients in the litigation
context.157 The principal policy reason for denying these claims is the vital
importance of the attorney as advocate in this relationship. When repre-
senting a client in a litigation setting, an attorney is ethically required to
represent the client zealously. Imposing a duty towards non-clients on at-
torneys would create a conflict of interest. It is this conflict that gives courts
pause.
Though the traditional remedy against opposing counsel-an action for
malicious prosecution-remains unavailing, courts are becoming more willing
to use 'court rules to impose liability on attorneys to their opponents in the
litigation context. The most significant development has been the increased
use of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to impose sanctions
on lawyers. Since August 1, 1983, every lawyer filing a pleading in federal
court has had to certify that "[to] the best of [the lawyer's] knowledge,
information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, [the pleading was]
well grounded in fact and ...warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for extension or reversal of existing law."' Additionally, the
156. Address to the Banking, Corporate, Business Law Section, New York Bar Association,
Jan. 24, 1974 [hereinafter Address of Commissioner Sommer].
157. Courts have been in universal accord in upholding the privity requirement in the
context of litigation. Certainly, the rule has been that an attorney has no liability to protect
the interests of an adverse party in litigation for an attorney's negligence. See, e.g., Fox v.
Pollack, 181 Cal. App. 3d 954, 226 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1986) (attorney has no duty to protect
interest of adverse party); St. Paul Title Co. v. Meier, 181 Cal. App. 3d 948, 226 Cal. Rptr.
538 (1986) (attorney's liability for professional negligence does not ordinarily extend beyond
the client except in situations where a third party is the intended beneficiary of the attorney's
services, or the foreseeability of harm to the third person is not outweighed by other policy
considerations). Malicious prosecution remains the only available theory, but the burden is
difficult to meet and the remedy provides little solace to plaintiffs. See, e.g., Berlin v. Nathan,
64 I11. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978) (the law looks disfavorably on malicious prosecution
suits and there are strict limitations on the availability of such suits).
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Essentially the same rule now applies to action filed in Illinois
state courts. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 2-611 (1986).
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lawyer must certify that the pleading is not being filed in order to harass,
unnecessarily delay or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.'5 9
In Rule 1I cases, courts have noted that the lawyer's conduct need not be
so egregious as to constitute bad faith. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, in Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service,'60 stated:
Most importantly, the previous requirement that the attorney against whom
sanctions were imposed must have acted in bad faith was eliminated. "The
new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose
sanctions ... by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and
reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions. "The standard
used is an objective "one of reasonableness under the circumstances,"
rather than a subjective one.' 6'
In Florida Monument Builders v. All Faiths Memorial Garden,' 62 the
district court imposed joint and several liability of $25,000 in attorney's fees
for filing an action alleging conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws. The
lawyer's failure to conduct an independent investigation of his client's alle-
gations provided the basis for the sanctions. 63 Similarly, in Hudson v. Moore
Business Forms, Inc., 's6 lawyers and their law firm were assessed nearly
$15,000 by a California district court for filing a counterclaim without factual
or legal support and with the motive of harassing plaintiff and deterring
other possible claimants. 6 Noting that counsel had earlier been warned by
the court about asserting unjustifiable claims, the court stated that "[i]f
these counsel persist in stepping over the line of permissible advocacy, more
severe sanctions must be considered. Opposing parties and their counsel, the
firm's own clients and the court should not be forced to expend time and
money on these lawyers' reckless adventures.' ' 66
In a somewhat similar vein, a New Jersey appellate court has recently
recognized a cause of action brought by an attorney against opposing counsel
for misrepresenting that the hearing of a case would be postponed. In
Malewich v. Zacharias, 67 an attorney was sued by his client for failing to
appear at trial in a divorce action. The attorney filed a third party complaint
against opposing counsel, alleging that he would have appeared at the trial
had opposing counsel not represented that he would call him if the case
were not adjourned. 6 Apparently, opposing counsel was allowed to proceed
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
160. 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
161. Id. at 205 (citations omitted).
162. 605 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
163. Id. at 1326.
164. 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
165. Id. at 484.
166. Id. at 485.
167. 196 N.J. Super. 372, 482 A.2d 951 (1985).
168. Id. at 374, 482 A.2d at 952.
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in the attorney's absence after informing the court that the attorney would
not appear.
69
Malewich held that if opposing counsel had capitalized on the attorney's
negligence by misrepresenting what had transpired, opposing counsel could
be held liable for all or part of a claim advanced by his opposing counsel's
client in a malpractice action. 170 The court stated that a member of the bar
should well understand that an adversary might reasonably rely upon rep-
resentations made to him, and thus a duty to the adversary could arise.1 71
The court concluded that the duty owed to the attorney stemmed from
disciplinary rules requiring attorneys to make only true statements to a court
and forbidding counsel from proceeding ex parte without notice to an
adversary. 7 2 According to the court, reliance upon such untrue statements
that subjected an attorney to civil liability could result in a damage award.1 73
From these cases and Rule 11, the development of a reasonableness
standard for attorney conduct towards an opponent emerges. In an adver-
sarial but non-litigious context, a California appellate court found a lawyer
potentially liable to another lawyer for misrepresentations made during a
contract negotiation. In Cicone v. URS Corp.,'7 the plaintiff-sellers sued
their attorney for malpractice resulting from negotiations for the sale of
their business. 7' The defendant-attorney filed a cross-claim alleging, among
other things, negligent misrepresentation on the part of the buyer's attor-
ney.' 76 The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the cross-complaint,
and dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court reversed. 77
Before the court of appeals, the plaintiff maintained that the factual
allegations contained in the cross-complaint could be amended.' 78 The Cicone
169. Id. at 374-75, 482 A.2d at 952.
170. Id. at 376, 482 A.2d at 953. Contribution claims by lawyers against opposing counsel
will likely be a source for a developing liability of lawyers to adverse parties in the context of
both litigation and negotiation. In addition to the Malewich case discussed above, a New York
appellate court acknowledged such a claim in Corva v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 108 A.D.2d
631, 485 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1985). The court approved a third party claim for contribution by a
lawyer charged with misrepresenting to his opponent the amount of insurance coverage available.
The attorney said that at least part of the loss was attributable to the failure of plaintiff's
counsel to inquire fully into the limits of the defendant's policy in the underlying case.
171. Malewich, 196 N.J. Super. at 397, 482 A.2d at 953.
172. Id. at 376, 482 A.2d at 953.
173. Id. at 377, 482 A.2d at 954.
174. 183 Cal. App. 3d 194, 227 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1986).
175. Id. at 198, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 888-89.
176. Id. at 189, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
177. Id. at 213, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
178. In early September of 1981, the seller and buyer entered into a preliminary agreement
for the sale of the seller's stock and assets. The final agreement was to be prepared by counsel
for the buyer and the defendant attorney was subsequently hired to represent the seller at the
closing. Some time prior to October 13, 1981, the buyer presented the seller with the proposed
final agreement, providing in part that the seller would warrant the accuracy of an unaudited
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court concluded that a duty of care logically flowed from the holding in
Roberts7 9 and Goodman:180
If the issuance of a legal opinion intended to secure a benefit for a client
must be issued with due care toward third persons who the attorneys
attempt or expect to influence on behalf of their clients, then a fortiori
why should such a duty of care not exist toward the third party's attorney
where an affirmative misrepresentation of fact is made directly to the
attorney for the purpose of influencing his client.8
The court stated that the policy factors identified in Biakanja,82 Lucas 83
and Heyer'84 supported this conclusion." 5 The court also noted that persons
such as the cross-defendant have or can readily obtain insurance against
such a risk.18 6 Finally, the court concluded that the imposition of a duty of
care under these circumstances was unlikely to pose any real threat to the
professional relationship between the attorney and client.8 7
From these cases and Rule 11, the beginnings of an attitudinal shift in
assessing attorney conduct emerges, even in the adversarial context. It is
submitted that, in coming years, courts will more frequently fashion remedies
for non-clients against attorneys in all contexts. The fear of treading even
slightly on the attorney's zeal and advocacy is abating. Concern now focuses
more on harm to the public and legal system from reputedly overzealous
counsel. As SEC Commissioner Sommer noted only twelve years ago:
We live in the age of the consumer. All of the old articles of faith which
frustrated him in efforts to achieve equity have fallen or are falling:
cognovit notes are repudiated in most places; the sale of installment paper
balance sheet. Other warranties contained in the agreement were made subject to the best of
the seller's knowledge. On October 13, 1981, the defendant attorney advised the parties
representing the buyer that the seller was unwilling and unable to guarantee the accuracy of
the balance sheet in question. The attorney for the buyer replied that the buyer would deem
the seller to be guaranteeing the information only to the seller's best knowledge and belief. The
defendant alleged that the buyer's attorney made this representation in order to induce the
defendant to advise his client to close the transaction immediately. He further alleged that the
representation was untrue, that the cross-defendant had no reasonable basis for believing it to
be true, and that the defendant and his client were intended to rely and did in fact rely upon
the negligent misrepresentation. Shortly after the transaction was consummated, the buyers filed
a claim against the sellers based on a $200,000.00 underestimation of deferred tax liabilities of
which the sellers had been unaware. The seller settled the claim for $125,000.00 and filed a
legal malpractice action against his attorney. Id. at 199, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
179. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
181. Cicone, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 210, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
182. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
185. Cicone, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 210, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
186. Id. at 210, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
187. Id. at 211, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98.
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no longer immunizes the paper purchaser from responsibility for the
shoddiness of the merchandise; people pressured into purchases on their
doorstep have time to think over their decision; the real costs of borrowing
and purchases on installments must be disclosed ....
I would suggest that in securities matters (other than those where advocacy
is clearly proper) the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin
to that of the auditor than to that of the advocate. This means several
things. It means he will have to exercise a measure of independence that
is perhaps uncomfortable if he is also the close-counselor of management
in other matters, often including business decisions. It means he will have
to be acutely cognizant of his responsibility to the public who engage in
securities transactions that would never have come about were it not for
his professional presence. It means he will have to be.' 88
188. Address of Commmissioner Sommer, supra note 156.

